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Abstract 
Research in corporate governance and labour law has been characterised by a 
disjuncture in the way that scholars in each field are addressing organisational 
questions related to the business enterprise. While labour has eventually begun to 
shift perspectives from aspirations to direct employee involvement in firm 
—————————————————— 
* Thanks to Larry Beeferman of Harvard’s Labor and Worklife Program (<http://www.law.
harvard.edu/programs/lwp>) for the invitation to the 2007 ‘Capital Matters V – Managing 
Labor’s Capital’ Conference and to William Lazonick, Cynthia Williams, David Soskice and 
Fenner Stewart for their valuable feedback. Research for this paper was conducted under the 
framework of the CLPE Comparative Research in Law and Political Economy Network at 
Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humani-
ties Research Council of Canada (Grant # 410-2005-2421) is gratefully acknowledged. 
∗∗  Canada Research Chair in the Transnational and Comparative Law of Corporate Gov-
ernance. Associate Dean (Research) and Director, CLPE, Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University, Toronto, Canada (<http://www.comparativeresearch.net>). E-mail: pzumbansen@ 
osgoode.yorku.ca. 
 Peer Zumbansen EBOR 8 (2007) 468 
management, as has been the case in Germany, to a combination of ‘exit’ and 
‘voice’ strategies involving pension fund management and securities litigation, it 
remains to be seen whether this new stream will unfold as a viable challenge to 
an otherwise exclusionary shareholder value paradigm. At the same time, recent 
suggestions made by Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court to 
dare think about potentially shared commitments between management and 
labour underline the viability of attempts at moving the corporate governance 
debate beyond the confines of corporate law proper. 
This paper takes the questionable divide between management and labour 
within the framework of a limiting corporate governance concept as a starting 
point to explore the institutional dynamics of the corporation, thereby building on 
the theory of the innovative enterprise as developed by management theorists 
Mary O’Sullivan and William Lazonick. Largely due to the sustained distance 
between corporate and labour law scholars, neither group has effectively 
addressed their common blind spot: a better understanding of the business 
enterprise itself. In the midst of an unceasing flow of affirmations of the finance 
paradigm of the corporation, on the one hand, and ‘voice’ strategies by labour, 
on the other, it seems to fall to management theorists to draw lessons from the 
continuing coexistence of different forms of market organisation, in which 
companies appear to thrive. Exploring the conundrum of ‘risky’ business deci-
sions within the firm, management theorists have been arguing for the need to 
adopt a more sophisticated organisational perspective on companies operating 
on locally, regionally and transnationally shaped, and often highly volatile, 
market segments. Research by comparative political economists has revealed a 
high degree of connectivity between corporate governance and economic 
performance without, however, arriving at such favourable results only for 
shareholder value regimes. Such findings support the view that corporate 
governance regimes are embedded in differently shaped regulatory frameworks, 
characterised by distinct institutions, both formal and informal, and enforcement 
processes. As a result of these findings, arguments to disassociate issues of 
corporate governance from those of the firm’s (social) responsibility (CSR) have 
been losing ground. Instead, CSR can be taken to be an essential part of under-
standing a particular business enterprise. It is the merging of a comparative 
political economy perspective on the corporation with one on the organisational 
features, structures and processes of the corporation that can help us better 
understand the distribution of power and knowledge within the ‘learning firm’. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance, innovative enterprise, learning firm, employee 
involvement, corporate social responsibility, German corporate governance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of the employee in the corporation is manifold. Starting with their 
performance of various functions, determined by the superiors, employees often 
play a much more differentiated role in the functioning of an organisation. It is 
obvious then that the form of the organisation – a small or middle-sized firm or a 
large, publicly traded corporation with operations around the world – has a direct 
impact on the role of the employee. This first observation is important if we want 
to avoid pursuing the question ‘what role for employees in the corporation’ in a 
one-size-fits-all manner. The size, structure, and embeddedness.1 of the corpora-
tion, as recently highlighted again by Sanford Jacoby,2 are directly related to our 
assessment of the role and involvement of employees in the organisation. In turn, 
the shape of the organisation is driven by developments in the political economy, 
of which the corporate, labour law and industrial relations regimes each form a 
part. This regulatory framework is increasingly less a domestic affair. The 
increased liquidity of funds available for the financing of corporate operations 
worldwide has been undercutting, informing and pushing domestic policy 
developments. It is thus no surprise that our view on what are the ‘leading 
political economies’ shifts with the particular regime’s aptness and capacity to 
adapt to the changing structures of world markets. Two interim conclusions 
follow: (1) corporate governance forms part of a larger regulatory framework 
which is constantly under pressure of being adapted at the domestic and, increas-
ingly, transnational level to the capabilities of global investors and capital flows; 
and (2) any assessment of the involvement and role of employees in the firm has 
to be made with this complex background and framework in mind. 
The following observations provide a few examples in support of the above 
two statements. The second section will address the current state of research into 
employee involvement in the firm from a comparative perspective and argue how 
issues of employee involvement are being shaped by contemporary developments 
—————————————————— 
1 For the origin of this concept, see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political 
and Economic Origins of Our Time (New York, 1944). It was subsequently further elaborated 
with a focus on networks by Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The 
Problem of Embeddedness’, 91 American Journal of Sociology (1985) p. 481; and Mark 
Granovetter, ‘The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes’, 19 J. Econ. Persp. 
(2005) p. 33). Critical of the concept is Jens Beckert, The Great Transformation of Embedded-
ness: Karl Polanyi and the New Economic Sociology, Max Planck Institute for the Study of 
Societies, Discussion Paper 07/1 (2007), who reads ‘The Great Transformation’ as ‘as a social 
theory’ and argues that a focus on networks fails to appreciate the more complexly structured 
market as framework of economic activity, on the one hand, and to address Polanyi’s concern 
with the consequences for ‘social order and political freedom when economic exchange is 
organized chiefly through self-regulating markets’, on the other. Ibid., at p. 17. 
2 Sanford M. Jacoby, The Embedded Corporation: Corporate Governance and Employ-
ment Relations in Japan and the United States (Princeton, Princeton University Press 2004). 
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in corporate governance. The next section will study in more detail the case of 
German co-determination in order to show how a long-held misconception is 
applied to what is and what is not ‘bad’ co-determination in German companies. 
It will also place this discussion in the context of current EU law-making in the 
area of corporate governance. The fourth section, then, will suggest an alternative 
perspective on employee involvement in the firm, one primarily informed by 
insights provided by management studies, organisational science and scholars of 
historical political economy. These scholars suggest a differentiated understand-
ing of the firm, where managerial success and economic performance depend on a 
set of institutional features inside and outside of the firm, encompassing commu-
nication and the creation and dissemination of knowledge between different levels 
of employees.3 and between the firm and societal knowledge actors. Couched in a 
vivid culture of incentive structures and adaptation techniques, which enhance 
collaborative efforts, experimenting and learning, the corporation can thus be seen 
as an integral part of a highly differentiated knowledge society. 
 
 
2. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Research into the role and involvement of employees in the contemporary 
business corporation, be it a small-scale, domestically or regionally operating 
enterprise or a large multinational corporation, reflects the larger trends in 
corporate governance and business organisation. We can differentiate between a 
human resources approach and a co-determination or control approach. The latter 
has been the much discussed model of German corporate governance, about 
which we will speak later in more detail. The former can be found, expressed in a 
very strong form, in Japanese corporate law and, in a weaker form, in the US 
corporate form. Co-determination comprises different forms of employee 
involvement in the management of the company. In contrast, a model focusing on 
human resources, can unfold without granting workers substantive input into 
management issues of the firm. Japanese corporate governance was hailed all 
throughout the 1980s as a model nurturing stable employments, skills training and 
intra-firm mobility.4 The human resources manager would regularly be part of the 
—————————————————— 
3 Granovetter (1985), loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 501: ‘When many employees have long tenures, 
the conditions are met for a dense and stable network of relations, shared understandings, and 
political conditions to be constructed.’ 
4 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, ‘Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and 
the United States’, 102 Yale. L. J. (1993) p. 1927. With a view to the changing dynamics of the 
political economy of such regulations, see Luke Nottage, ‘Japanese Corporate Governance at a 
Crossroads: Variation in Varieties of Capitalism’, 27 North Carolina Journal of International 
Law and Commercial Regulation (2001) p. 255; Luke Nottage, ‘Nothing New in the North-
East? Interpreting the Rhetoric and Reality of Japanese Corporate Governance’, 2 CLPE 
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firm’s managerial cohort, given that employee well-being and the preservation of 
stable employment relations ranked high on the Japanese corporate governance 
agenda. By comparison, in the United States, human resources have not been 
considered a crucial or vital element of corporate governance. Human resources 
managers regularly take second or third place after strategic and, more recently, 
financial management personnel. The US model can probably best be understood 
as a ‘market model’, while for the Japanese one the label ‘organisational model’ 
appears most suitable.5 There is certainly a whole host of elements and issues 
connected with such a characterisation, and this should already indicate that any 
such label hardly captures the complexity of how decisions are taken in and for 
the business enterprise. Even less can such labels fully illustrate the wealth of 
elements conducive to sustained economic success. It is here, where business 
historians, economists and corporate governance scholars.6 have much to say to all 
those who perhaps too quickly assume the triumph of a certain organisational 
paradigm.7 
As can be observed over the last fifteen years, the German co-determination 
model and the Japanese human resources model have come under pressure. First 
and foremost, global financial liquidity and the ever shorter periods over which a 
company’s economic performance is being assessed seem to leave little room for 
the long-term orientation that both German.8 and Japanese.9 firms have long been 
endorsing. This development has been taken by many to reflect on a fundamental 
—————————————————— 
Research Paper Series (2007), available at: <http://www.comparativeresearch.net>; William 
Lazonick, ‘The Japanese Economy and Corporate Reform: What Path to Sustainable Prosper-
ity?’, in William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, eds., Corporate Governance and Sustainable 
Prosperity (London/Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan 2002) p. 226. 
5 Ibid., at p. 11.  
6 See, Mary O’Sullivan, Contests for Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and 
Economic Performance in the United States and Germany (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2000); Mary O’Sullivan, ‘The innovative enterprise and corporate governance’, 24 Cambridge 
Journal of Economics (2000) p. 393; Oliver E. Williamson, ‘The Modern Corporation: Origins, 
Evolution, Attributes’, 19 J. Econ. Lit. (1981) p. 1537; William Lazonick, ‘Innovative 
Enterprise and Historical Transformation’, 3 Enterprise & Society (2002) p. 3; Antoine 
Rebérioux, ‘The end of history in corporate governance? A critical appraisal’, Amsterdam 
Research Centre for Corporate Governance Regulation, Inaugural Workshop 17-18 December 
2004, available at: <http://www.arccgor.nl/uploads/File/Reberioux%20Amsterdam%202.pdf>; 
Friedrich Kübler, ‘A Shifting Paradigm of European Company Law?’, 11 Colum. J. Eur. L. 
(2005) p. 219 at pp. 239-240: ‘But the complex rules and cumbersome and lengthy procedures 
are the result of political compromises, which are very much shaped by the ideas and assump-
tions of the past; they show specific features of “path-dependence” and the stickiness of well-
established institutional arrangements.’ 
7 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, 89 
Geo. L. J. (2001) p. 439. 
8 Klaus J. Hopt, ‘Corporate Governance in Germany’, in Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch, 
eds., Capital Markets and Company Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003) p. 289. 
9 Nottage (2001), loc. cit. n. 4. 
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convergence of corporate governance regimes. To explore the validity and the 
lessons from such a finding, we need to place these contentions in the context of 
comparative assessments of legal structures and their larger institutional, political, 
economic and cultural environment. 
 
2.1 Le regard d’autrui: comparative perspectives on company law 
 
The alleged convergence of corporate governance regimes around the world has 
been on the mind of investors, policy-makers and scholars for some years now.10 
In fact, whether such a convergence is actually taking place has at the same time 
been contested by many participants in the debate.11 The trickiness of such 
assessments of a moving target is certainly also felt by such a keen observer as 
The Economist, which in a recent survey on ‘European Business’ swayed between 
dismissal of the European way of doing things, on the one hand, and Europe’s 
promise to pull through, on the other.12 Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr. noted an 
abundance of ‘tired features’ in the ‘so-called corporate governance debate. 
‘Exaggeration is the norm; conversation the exception.’13 
—————————————————— 
10  See, e.g., the contributions in Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers 
and Luc Renneborg, eds., Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe, eds., Conver-
gence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
2004). A recent publication laudably takes a more contextual approach and features a compre-
hensive section on regulatory structures, bureaucracy and administrative law: see Klaus J. Hopt, 
Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda and Harald Baum, eds., Corporate Governance in Context: 
Corporations, States and Markets in Europe, Japan and the US (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 2005). 
11  See, e.g., Sigurt Vitols, ‘Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and 
the UK’, in Peter E. Hall and David W. Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) p. 337; Sally 
Wheeler, Corporations and the Third Way (Oxford, Hart 2002); Wolfgang Streeck, ‘German 
Capitalism: Does it Exist? Can it Survive?’, in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., 
Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London, SAGE 1997) p. 33; Ronald Dore, William 
Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, ‘Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century’, 15 Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy (1999) p. 102. See also the contributions in Wolfgang Streeck and 
Kozo Yamamura, eds., The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism (Ithaca, Cornell University Press 
2001); and Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., The End of Diversity? Prospects for 
German and Japanese Capitalism (Ithaca, Cornell University Press 2003). Harald Baum, 
‘Change of Governance in Historic Perspective: The German Experience’, in Hopt et al., op. 
cit. n. 10, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=695741>, observes that a ‘gradual and partial 
de-bundling of the corporatist “Deutschland AG” appears to be somewhat probable.’ Ibid., at p. 
21. See also Kübler, loc. cit. n. 6, at p. 239: ‘slow, piecemeal, cumbersome’ changes of cor-
porate law structures in Europe. 
12  ‘Who are the Champions?’, The Economist, 8 February 2007, available at: <http://www. 
economist.com/surveys/displayStory.cfm?story_id=8621685>. 
13  Leo E. Strine Jr., ‘Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the 
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance’, 
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At the outset of any assessment of converging regulatory regimes should lie an 
appreciation of what it is that is allegedly converging. In other words, we need to 
be clear on what we mean by corporate governance and which aspects of it we 
currently see changing. Secondly, we need to be mindful that identifying and 
evaluating current developments necessitates a comparison of not only different 
systems’ formal rules and codifications but also their customs and business 
practices. In other words, we need to compare the law on the books and the law in 
action. The latter, certainly in the area of corporate governance, constitutes a 
wide-ranging variety of informal rules, standards, codes of conduct and under-
standings of relevant business communities. While these form an integral part of a 
vibrant legal and economic environment, they are much harder to identify and 
ascertain by an outside observer. 
In this light, I would like to suggest that we attempt our comparison of exist-
ing corporate governance regimes through a combination of traditional modes of 
comparative law, that is to say, its instruments, norms and their functionality, on 
the one hand,14 and the political economy of corporate governance, in particular 
the mix of formal and informal, of hard and soft laws, rules, standards and 
practices, on the other.15 This combination will allow us to appreciate the real 
changes that are taking place in different corporate law regimes around the world. 
In addition, such a perspective will allow us to gain a deeper understanding of the 
currently unfolding trends of convergence and divergence between corporate 
governance regimes in regional markets and regulatory spaces such as the 
European Union. Here, for example, the particular history of corporate law 
harmonisation cannot be properly understood without such a ‘deeper reading’ of 
the hard-soft forms of corporate law development that are characterising contem-
porary changes in the existing regulatory regimes.16 The European scene for 
corporate law-making, then, is a remarkable laboratory for the study of multilevel 
and multipolar law-making in a politically and culturally contested arena, where 
different historically grown and embedded political economies are colliding.17 
—————————————————— 
The Dorsey and Whitney Foundation Lecture, 10 March 2007, forthcoming in J. Corp. Law 
(2007) p. 3, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=989624>. 
14  See only Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method in Comparative Law’, in Mathias 
Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2006) p. 339. 
15  Peer Zumbansen, ‘Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory Com-
petition in European Company Law’, 12 Eur. L. J. (2006) p. 534, available at: <http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=902695>. 
16  Simon Deakin, ‘Reflexive Governance and European Company Law,’ CLPE Research 
Paper Series (2007), available at: <http://www.comparativeresearch.net>; Peer Zumbansen, 
‘The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor Law’, 13 Indiana Journal of Global 
Studies (2006) p. 261, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=902650>. 
17  Martin Rhodes and Bastian van Apeldoorn, ‘Capital Unbound? The Transformation of 
European Corporate Governance’, 5 Journal of European Public Policy (1998) p. 406; Vanessa 
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2.2 What is corporate governance? 
 
Confusion over the potential impact of the alleged convergence in different 
corporate governance regimes is what lies at the heart of what we mean by 
‘corporate governance’. The law of corporate governance, commonly conceived 
as ‘company law’, ‘corporate law’ or ‘business associations’, is embedded in a 
larger regulatory scene that also comprises fields such as securities regulation, 
labour law, industrial relations and insolvency law. But these legal fields are 
complemented by a set of institutions that structure the development and practice 
of corporate governance. Building on the work of Karl Polanyi in the 1940s,18 
economic sociologists focus on the ‘embeddedness’ of economic action and have 
been providing a plethora of intriguing case studies and analysis.19 of the ‘institu-
tional, cultural and social contexts’20 in which commercial transactions are 
unfolding.21 In order to trace the particular characteristics of distinct national 
systems of corporate governance, it is essential to cast light on the historical, 
socio-economic and legal developments that have contributed to national varia-
tion. While there is an important body of literature underlining the relevance of 
historical trajectories and the associated competitive advantages of national 
differences (the so-called ‘varieties of capitalism’ school.22.), there is a wide 
agreement that these distinct national systems are under severe and growing 
pressure towards convergence. The privatisation of public welfare systems and 
—————————————————— 
Edwards, ‘The European Company – Essential Tool or Eviscerated Dream?’, 40 Common 
Market Law Review (2003) p. 443; Peer Zumbansen, ‘European Corporate Law and National 
Divergences: The Case of Takeover Law’, 3 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. (2004) p. 867. 
18  Polanyi, op. cit. n. 1. 
19  Among the most eminent contributions in this regard is Granovetter (1985), loc. cit. n. 1. 
The Director of the Cologne-based Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Jens 
Beckert, refers to that article as ‘the “founding manifesto” of the new economic sociology’. See 
Beckert, op. cit. n. 1, at p. 6. 
20  Beckert, op. cit. n. 1, at p. 16. 
21  See Hartmut Berghoff, ‘Markterschließung und Risikomanagement’, 92 Vierteljahre-
schrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (2005) p. 141; Richard Whitley, ‘The Institutional 
Structuring of Innovation Strategies: Business Systems, Firm Types and Patterns of Techno-
logical Change in Different Market Economies’, 21 Organization Studies (2000) p. 855; 
William Lazonick, ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Innovative Enterprise’, 24 Comparative Social 
Research (2007) p. 21. 
22  Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, in 
Hall and Soskice, op. cit. n. 11, at p. 1; David Soskice, ‘Divergent Production Regimes: 
Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s’, in Herbert 
Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks and John D. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in 
Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999) p. 101; Dore, 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan, loc. cit. n. 11; Robert Boyer, ‘Coherence, Diversity, and the 
Evolution of Capitalisms – The Institutional Complementarity Hypothesis’, 2 Evol. Inst. Econ. 
Rev. (2005) p. 43 at pp. 45-47; see also Matthew Allen, ‘The varieties of capitalism paradigm: 
not enough variety?’, 2 Socio-Economic Review (2004) p. 87. 
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the increased tendency to base pension and retirement financing on the capital 
market.23 have coincided with a worldwide competition for stock market invest-
ments.24 As a consequence, the capacity of traditional stakeholder-oriented 
systems of corporate governance to provide the transparency and management 
control that is necessary for success in the global competition for investments is 
increasingly contested.25 
Beyond the disputes over the merits of ‘shareholder primacy’, however, lies 
the essential question: the nature of the business corporation itself.26 Beyond the 
ongoing struggle between shareholder- and stakeholder-oriented concepts of 
corporate governance.27 lies a wide field of research concerning the organisational 
design of today’s corporation as a complex and innovative institution of social 
learning.28 The involvement of workers within the firm is not an issue that can be 
solely understood against the background of established and hotly contested 
models of co-determination.29 Rather, the role of workers in the firm can itself be 
—————————————————— 
23  Friedrich Kübler, ‘The Impact of Equity Markets on Business Organization: Some Com-
parative Observations Regarding Differences in the Evolution of Corporate Structures’, 2 
EBOR (2001) p. 669; Friedrich Kübler, ‘The Rules of Capital Under Pressure of the Securities 
Markets’, in Hopt and Wymeersch, op. cit. n. 8, at p. 95. 
24  Theodor Baums, ‘Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law-
Making Process of a Very New Nature’, 2 German Law Journal (2001), available at: <http:// 
www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43>; Theodor Baums, ‘Company Law Reform 
in Germany’, 3 J. Corp. L. Stud. (2003) p. 181. 
25  Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law?’, 
in McCahery et al., op. cit. n. 10, at p. 56. 
26  Simon Deakin, ‘Workers, Finance and Democracy’, in Catherine Barnard, Simon Deakin 
and Gillian S. Morris, eds., The Future of Labour Law: Liber Amicorum Bob Hepple (Oxford, 
Hart 2003) p. 79. 
27  Richard Mitchell, Anthony O’Donnell and Ian Ramsay, ‘Shareholder Value and Em-
ployee Interests: Intersections between Corporate Governance, Corporate Law and Labour 
Law’ (2005), available at: <http://cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/research-papers/Shareholder%20 
value%20paper%20_23.06.05_.pdf>. 
28  Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Die Prozeduralisierung des Unternehmens’, in Dieter Hart, ed., 
Privatrecht im ‘Risikostaat’ (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1997) p. 137; Irene Lynch Fannon, 
Working Within Two Kinds of Capitalism: Corporate Governance and Employee Stakeholding: 
US and EC Perspectives (Oxford, Hart 2003); James E. Post, Lee E. Preston and Sybille Sachs, 
Redefining the Corporation: Stakeholder Management and Organizational Wealth (Stanford, 
Stanford Business Books 2002); Antoine Pirovano, ‘La “boussole” de la société. Intéret 
commun, intéret social, intéret de l’entreprise’, Recueil Dalloz (1997) p. 189; Michel Crozier, 
L’entreprise à l’écoute. Apprendre le management post-industriel (Paris, Interéditions 1989); 
Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Conundrum of Corporate Social Responsibility: Remarks on the 
Changing Nature of Firms and States’, in Rebecca M. Bratspies and Russell A. Miller, eds., 
Transboundary Harm: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2006) p. 274; Lazonick, loc. cit. n. 21. 
29  See, e.g., Jens Dammann, ‘The Future of Codetermination after Centros: Will German 
Corporate Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?’, 8 Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law (2003) p. 607; Anja Strüve, ‘Deutscher Juristentag 2006’, 1 Legal Latitudes 
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explained only with regard to the ways in which the firm is organised to generate, 
channel and process fragmented knowledge and innovative capacity.30 The 
association of workers’ involvement with a firm’s social,31 intellectual and 
innovative capital certainly differs from the hitherto held perception that workers’ 
involvement in corporate governance is merely an inefficient check on share-
holder power. In fact, switching from a conflict model, which opposes 
shareholders against employees, to one of cooperation and integration of view-
points, capacities and processes opens up a new perspective on workers’ 
involvement. This perspective is directed at the productive input of workers’ 
knowledge for a more efficient governance of the firm.32 The latter differs from 
the much-discussed and often not sufficiently understood form of co-
determination as it exists, for example, in German supervisory boards.33 In these, 
half of the board’s members are employee representatives. This has led many 
observers to a harsh dismissal of this powerful influence of workers. The fact 
remains, however, that the chairman of the supervisory board, usually a share-
—————————————————— 
(2007) p. 4 at p. 5, available at: <www.osgoode.yorku.ca/legallatitudes>. From the ongoing 
vivid German discussion, see, for a conciliatory viewpoint, Thomas Raiser, 
Unternehmensmitbestimmung vor dem Hintergrund europarechtlicher Entwicklungen. 
Gutachten B zum 66. Deutschen Juristentag, Stuttgart 2006 (Munich, Beck 2006) pp. B 111-
116; Walter Bayer, ‘Auswirkungen der Niederlassungsfreiheit nach den EuGH-Entscheidungen 
Inspire Art und Überseering auf die deutsche Unternehmensmitbestimmung’, 49 Die 
Aktiengesellschaft (2004) p. 534 at pp. 537-538. In contrast, see Michael Adams, ‘Das Ende der 
Mitbestimmung’, 27 Zeitschrift für Insolvenzpraxis (2006) p. 1561; Martin Hennsler, 
‘Bewegung in der deutschen Mitbestimmungsdiskussion – Reformdruck durch 
Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft’, Recht der Arbeit (2005) p. 330; and Eberhard Schwark, 
‘Globalisierung, Europarecht und Unternehmensmitbestimmung im Konflikt’, 49 Die 
Aktiengesellschaft (2004) p. 173. With a call not for abandonment but for reform from a 
particular focus on the organisational structures within the company, on the one hand, and the 
firm’s overall competitiveness based on business strategy and product quality, on the other: 
Axel von Werder, ‘Überwachungseffizienz und Unternehmensmitbestimmung’, 49 Die 
Aktiengesellschaft (2004) p. 166. 
30  Antoine Rebérioux, ‘Les marchés financiers et la participation des salariés aux déci-
sions’, 93 Travail et Emploi (2003) p. 25; Antoine Rebérioux, ‘European Style of Corporate 
Governance at the Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement’, 40 Journal of Common 
Market Studies (2002) p. 111; Whitley, loc. cit. n. 21, at p. 864. 
31  See Ian Jones, Michael Pollitt and David Bek, ‘Multinationals in their Communities: A 
Social Capital Approach to Corporate Citizenship Projects’ (2006), available at: <http://www. 
cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP337.pdf>. 
32  Ash Amin and Patrick Cohendet, Architectures of Knowledge: Firms, Capabilities and 
Communities (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004) p. 113: ‘The first and most obvious 
“management” step implicit in a model of learning by doing is clear recognition of the limits of 
management by design, of the top-down inculcation of creativity.’ 
33  For a concise presentation of the model, see only Katharina Pistor, ‘Codetermination: A 
Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities’, in Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. Roe, 
eds., Employees and Corporate Governance (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press 
1999) p. 163. 
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holder representative, holds the deciding vote. The confusion about the parity of 
powers in the supervisory board is legendary. While the fact of the chairman’s 
deciding vote alone should put overly troubled minds to rest about the purportedly 
counterproductive effects of co-determined supervisory boards of large German 
enterprises, even recent empirical evidence from German companies indeed 
seems to suggest that many managers recognise benefits from the – still – existing 
system.34 
In contrast, the other form of co-determination, which has always existed in 
the shadow of the internationally discussed and scrutinised board co-
determination, concerns so-called works councils. These can be formed in all 
companies with at least five employees, if at least three have been with the firm 
for six months. 
Works councils are constituted only by employees and are elected by secret 
ballot. They are understood as being a counterpart to management and play a 
crucial role in the firing process, seeking together with management to maintain 
socially justifiable criteria when selecting personnel to be laid off. This form of 
worker involvement, from an international perspective, has existed in a quiet, 
neglected corner of the otherwise heated corporate governance debate. While the 
law clearly attributes a relatively prominent role to works councils, their institu-
tional success has been varied.35 Only recently, works councils have acquired a 
more positively regarded currency. One of the reasons for this development was 
the 1994 introduction of so-called European Works Councils.36 Their success has 
been ambiguous at best, assessments ranging from doubts over unions pursuing 
their local interests through the newly established EWCs.37 and critical evaluations 
of the less-empowered EWCs when compared to the German Betriebsräte.38 to a 
sceptical rejection of EWCs as yet another mosaic stone in an already losing 
battle for organised labour interests.39 While these developments unfolded at the 
European level, domestically works councils became increasingly entangled in 
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34  Martin Höpner, ‘Mitbestimmungskritik hält Prüfung nicht stand’, 6 Mitbestimmung 
(2004) pp. 54-57, available at: <http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/people/mh/paper/MB_6-
2004.pdf>. 
35  Manfred Weiss, ‘Labor Law’, in Joachim Zekoll and Mathias Reimann, eds., Introduc-
tion to German Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International/Munich, Beck 2006) p. 299 at pp. 
311-312. 
36  Paul Marginson, Mark Hall, Aline Hoffmann and Torsten Müller, ‘The Impact of Euro-
pean Works Councils on Management Decision Making in UK and US-based Multinationals: A 
Case Study Comparison’, 42 British Journal of Industrial Relations (2004) p. 209. 
37  Bob Hancké, ‘European Works Councils and Industrial Restructuring in the European 
Motor Industry’, 6 Eur. J. Ind. Rel. (2000) p. 35. 
38  Wolfgang Streeck, ‘The Internationalization of Industrial Relations in Europe: Prospects 
and Problems’, 26 Politics & Society (1998) p. 429. 
39  Thorsten Schulten, ‘European Works Councils: Prospects for a New System of European 
Industrial Relations’, 2 Eur. J. Ind. Rel. (1999) p. 303. 
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pressure systems created by firm management, on the one hand, and trade unions, 
on the other. While the latter eventually conceded so-called opening clauses that 
would allow variations to the collective agreement to be stipulated at the firm 
level, management has taken this opportunity in recent years to forcefully push 
employees to enter into unfavourable agreements in exchange for, say, job 
security. Effectively, works councils can now often be seen to accept agreements 
that contain standards that are well below the threshold contained in collective 
agreements. Trade unions themselves find themselves facing the dilemma that 
their protest would potentially drive more of their already weakening members 
away.40 
Taking a step back from this labour interests perspective, however, we can 
identify a set of other considerations relating to the works councils. Here, then, 
another reason for the increased attention received by works councils can be seen 
in the overwhelming pressure on firms to improve their competitiveness (insepa-
rable from their organisational structure), the firms’ location and the applicable 
laws governing salaries, production and social costs. In this context, works 
councils are increasingly being recognised as essential fora for the much-needed 
negotiation between management and employees in developing and realising the 
most cost-effective solutions for the firm’s future.41 A crucial aspect, then, is that, 
at the same time as the influence of trade unions is diminishing, works councils 
might be seen as enforcing their own demise instead of being able to work against 
it. In this light, works councils can be seen to be entering a pact with the devil. 
Where agreements between management and employees that are pursued as part 
of industrial restructuring strategies on the part of management in highly competi-
tive industries can be reached at the level of the firm,42 the larger framework of 
workers’ representation in a coordinated market becomes economy questionable. 
In reality, management can exercise a large degree of pressure on works councils 
by connecting demands on lower wages, longer working hours and so on with 
threats of relocation, plant closure and the like – all that in exchange for job 
security, for the time being.43 
This problematic interaction between management and works councils cer-
tainly does not invite a very optimistic view on management-employee relations. 
To be sure, it is not the fact that there is such interaction that is problematic but 
the reduction of the works council to a transmission belt that communicates the 
management’s will to the employee constituency. In this scenario, chances might 
remain unused for a resource-based, fruitful and sustained collaboration between 
the different power levels within the corporation. 
—————————————————— 
40  Weiss, loc. cit. n. 35, at p. 319. 
41  Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Works Councils: Consultation, Representation, 
and Cooperation in Industrial Relations (London, University of Chicago Press 1996). 
42  Hancké, loc. cit. n. 37, at p. 39. 
43  Weiss, loc. cit. n. 35, at p. 319. 
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This last aspect is important. As indicated, there is a second reason for the 
recent interest in works councils. In fact, this reason provides a much more 
positive perspective on the interaction among the different powers within the 
firm. Organisational science scholars and management theorists have been 
emphasising the economic gains that can result from close cooperation between 
management and the firm’s work force. The value of workers’ input in refining, 
strengthening and consolidating the firm’s performance is increasingly recognised 
in traditionally organised firms and to a certain degree also in more loosely 
organised, unbundled or networked firms. The latter has been described by 
organisation and labour scholars as the final deadly blow delivered to workers’ 
rights, given that organising becomes more difficult as the firm becomes more 
decentralised, as the organisational structure becomes more opaque and employ-
ment relations become more precarious. The combination of corporate 
organisation in the twenty-first century firm and the flexibilisation of work 
constitutes the dark side of the culture of the new capitalism.44 At the same time, 
the very volatility of corporate organisation in a networked economy must not 
necessarily lead only to a further erosion of workers’ power within a firm. More 
sophisticated studies by management and organisation theorists show that 
management in many cases relies on a healthy and functioning relationship with 
the firm’s employees, especially where high profile and fast-changing organisa-
tional patterns require capacities of adaptation and responsiveness.45 
As an interim observation, we can say that co-determination exists in two 
forms, one involving quasi-parity of shareholder and employee representatives on 
the supervisory board of large stock corporations and the other one involving 
works councils in small to large firms. The first form has regularly attracted a lot 
of international attention and has recently attracted strong criticism as constituting 
a so-called ‘competitive disadvantage’ in the global race for investment. And yet, 
a closer look at the voting structures of the board, together with the deliberation 
practices long followed by corporate actors in Germany, reveals – as we saw 
above – the myth behind the much-discussed German social model, of which co-
determination has always been seen as a central pillar.46 The latter model, located 
in works councils, has only more recently stepped forward to play a remarkably 
differentiated role. On the one hand, works councils have become the site for the 
implementation of management policy concerning restructuring, plant relocation 
and closing. On the other, works councils could come to be seen as potentially 
important players in tapping, structuring and realising knowledge and capacity 
pools that exist within the firm. The latter, more positive perspective on workers’ 
—————————————————— 
44  Richard Sennett, The Culture of the New Capitalism (New Haven, Yale University Press 
2006). 
45  Jones, Pollitt and Bek, loc. cit. n. 31. 
46  Streeck, loc. cit. n. 11, at p. 37. 
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3. THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL: SPACES AND PLACES OF CONVERGENCE 
AND DIVERGENCE 
 
The following section will place these observations into the context of the contem-
porary corporate law-making environment in the European Union and Germany (in 
particular with a view to complementing official rules with unofficial ones such as 
soft norms, recommendations and codes of conduct). Before this, however, it is 
necessary to allude briefly to the larger conceptual framework in which these 
developments have been taking place. Today, contemporary global developments 
demand the attention of domestic law reformers in the areas of corporate law and 
securities regulation. There are different ways, in which national governments or, in 
the case of the European Union, regional lawmakers, have been reacting to interna-
tional developments. The post-Cold War opening of formerly closed markets, along 
with the large-scale restructuring of publicly financed services and infrastructures 
and their replacement by privatisation and deregulation, has fundamentally altered 
the playing field for business corporations, investors and interest groups, as well as 
for domestic and transnational regulators. 
 
Table 1: The End(s) of History 
END OF HISTORY I 
Francis Fukuyama (1992): End of History 
Michel Albert (1991): Capitalisme contra Capitalisme 
END OF HISTORY II 
Hall/Soskice (2001): Varieties of Capitalism 
Hansmann/Kraakman (2001): End of History in Corporate Law 
 
To trace how these global developments translate in a domestic and a regional 
context, the following subsection will take a closer look at both the EU company 
law scene and the corporate law reform process currently taking place in Germany. 
 
3.1 Germany’s company law reform and changing regulatory 
landscapes 
 
The 1980s and 1990s in Germany were a period of difficult bargaining between a 
pro-shareholder government and deeply entrenched stakeholders, unions and 
lobby groups. With the end of Social Democratic government in 1982, the 
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Christian Democratic/Liberal majority took power in 1983. In 1998, at the end of 
Christian Democratic rule, the first major corporate law reform legislation since 
the 1960s was finally adopted. The Law on Corporate Control and Transparency 
(KonTraG.) introduced a number of elements designed to improve German 
corporate governance, long criticised for its less developed disclosure rules and, 
importantly, for its already mentioned two-tier board, in which worker representa-
tives have half the seats on the supervisory board – but as we have seen – not half 
the votes, as the chairman, a shareholder representative, has the deciding vote. 
The KonTraG left this structure untouched, as well as the high number of seats 
on the supervisory board, and thereby failed to satisfy longstanding demands to 
change the German system and make the supervisory board more effective.47 The 
German debate concerning the reform of the supervisory board has not lost in 
intensity and has indeed received renewed input from a combination of forces 
both at the domestic and the transnational and European level. 
Domestic corporate law reform discussions such as those in Germany.48 or in 
other countries.49 are taking place in the light of a European and global debate 
over competition for mobile capital and how corporate law systems might 
accommodate companies’ needs to tap into these capital markets without bounda-
ries.50 At the same time, the debate is taking place against the background of a 
complex European integration process in which the political and cultural outcome 
remains unsettled.51 
—————————————————— 
47  For an excellent discussion of these changes, see only John W. Cioffi, ‘Restructuring 
“Germany Inc.”: The Politics of Corporate Governance Reform in Germany and the European 
Union’, 24 Law & Policy (2002) p. 355; John W. Cioffi, ‘Corporate Governance Reform, 
Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and 
Germany’, 7 German L. J. (2006) p. 533. 
48  See, e.g., Baums (2003), loc. cit. n. 24; Ulrich Seibert, ‘The Company Law Reform 
Projects of the German Ministry of Justice’, 69 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht (2005) p. 712; Ulrich Noack and Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Corporate 
Governance in Germany: The Second Decade’, Center for Business and Corporate Law (CBC) 
Research Paper Series (2005). 
49  Guido Ferrarini, Paolo Guidici and Maria Stella Richter, ‘Company Law Reform in 
Italy: Real Progress?’, 69 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 
(2005) p. 658; Eilís Ferran, ‘The Company Law Reform in the United Kingdom: A Progress 
Report’, ibid., pp. 629-657; Michel Menjucq, ‘The Company Law Reform in France’, ibid., pp. 
698-711; Claude Champaud and Didier Danet, ‘NRE’, Revue trimestrielle de droit commercial 
et de droit économique (2002) p. 17. 
50  See the contributions in Steven Weber, ed., Globalization and the European Political 
Economy (New York, Columbia University Press 2001). 
51  Joseph H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale L. J. (1991) p. 2403; 
Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 1999); Christian Joerges, ‘The Law’s Problems with the Governance of the European 
Market’, in Christian Joerges and Renaud Dehousse, eds., Good Governance in Europe’s 
Integrated Market (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) p. 3; Christoph Möllers, ‘European 
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It is obvious that, within the European Union, the varieties of capitalism ap-
proach is of great significance, for it explicitly addresses the embedded, 
historically grown socio-political and cultural systems of the Member States.52 
How difficult it would be to achieve any harmonisation of company law standards 
in Europe given the high degree of diversity of existing company law regimes 
was strongly evidenced by the decades-long struggle over the European Com-
pany, originally initiated as early as the 1970s and adopted after many 
compromises in 2001.53 Another example of the European varieties of capitalism 
in the field is the almost fifteen-year-long fight over a European Takeover 
Directive. This was concluded only in 2004, resulting in a directive that contains 
so many opt-out clauses, that the question has been asked whether it has led to 
any harmonisation at all.54 
International attention is usually attracted by the noise that surrounds the lar-
ger developments, such as European directives or the corporate governance 
standards promulgated by international bodies such as the OECD (Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development) or by domestic legislators (such as 
the US Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002). Less attention is focused on the dramatically 
more complex forms of law reform that take place at other levels and are not so 
easily discernable by the outside spectator. Examples of such reforms can be 
found within the myriad ways in which Member States move to implement 
European law into their domestic legal orders. While there are straightforward 
and easy ways to track reforms, as for example when a Member State passes a 
law that appears to translate a European directive into its domestic legal frame-
work, in reality such law-making processes take very different forms within hotly 
contested fields. In short, they take place in many unofficial, harder to trace ways, 
as the landscape of norm making in corporate law (as in many other areas) has 
been changing dramatically. The emergence of privately made best practice 
guidelines, codes of conduct and corporate governance codes has led to a far-
reaching change of the relevant regulatory landscape in which companies operate 
today.55 But many of its features and elements are not – and arguably cannot – be 
—————————————————— 
Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept’, 43 Common Market Law Review (2006) p. 
313. 
52  Hall and Soskice, op. cit. n. 11. 
53  Erik Werlauff, ‘The SE Company – A New Common European Company from 8 Octo-
ber 2004’, 14 European Business Law Review (2003) p. 85; Christoph Teichmann, ‘The 
European Company – A Challenge to Academics, Legislatures and Practitioners’, 4 German L. 
J. (2003) p. 309. 
54  Christian Kirchner and Richard W. Painter, ‘Takeover Defenses under Delaware Law, 
the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and 
Recommendations for Reform’, 50 American Journal of Comparative Law (2002) p. 451; 
Zumbansen, loc. cit. n. 17. 
55  Ben Pettet, ‘Combined Code: A Firm Place for Self-Regulation in Corporate Govern-
ance’, 13 Journal of International Banking Law (1998) p. 394; Baums (2001), loc. cit. n. 24; 
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truthfully represented and documented in the official legislation. The proliferation 
of private, semi-public and quasi-public lawmakers in the fields of corporate and 
securities law has altered the regulatory landscape so that it has become much 
harder to develop a political critique of the processes as they unfold. In corporate 
law, this is expressed by corporate governance codes and best practice recom-
mendations, as it is in the case of labour law by codes of conduct, which purport 
to provide for a comprehensive regulation of employment relationships.56 To be 
sure, the shift away from traditional forms of law-making and the embrace of 
myriad ways of norm creation (often summarised as ‘governance’) has had as one 
of its consequences the highly problematic removal of many regulatory changes 
from the political debate. In many cases, ‘demands’ of the market are offered as 
sufficient justifications for legal change, effectively moving it outside of the 
political arena of deliberation and contestation. 
Illustrating this point are the deep-reaching changes to that element of German 
corporate governance that seems to be at the core of the ‘end of history’ critique 
of Germany’s need for reform, on the one hand, and of Mark Roe’s characterisa-
tion of ‘social democratic’ corporate governance, on the other.57 The here found 
depiction of the allegedly social democratic origins, nature and preservation of 
workers’ co-determination on company boards may, however, blind our view to 
the much more nuanced, ambiguous and multi-directional lines along which 
corporate governance has been evolving. 
Indeed, one of the most discussed features of German company law – co-
determination – has been attracting scathing criticism from the press, both from 
lobbyists who fear the negative signal co-determination sends to prospective and 
much needed international investors and from scholars.58 Even the national 
lawyers’ meeting in the autumn of 2006 put co-determination on the agenda and 
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Peer Zumbansen, ‘The Privatization of Corporate Law? Corporate Governance Codes and 
Commercial Self-Regulation’, Juridikum (2002) p. 136; Johannes Köndgen, ‘Privatisierung des 
Rechts. Private Governance zwischen Deregulierung und Rekonstitutionalisierung’, 206 AcP 
(2006) p. 477. 
56  For a critique, see Harry W. Arthurs, ‘Private Ordering and Workers’ Rights in the 
Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation’, in 
Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl and Karl Klare, eds., Labour Law in an Era of 
Globalization. Transformative Practices and Possibilities (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2002) p. 471; Adelle Blackett, ‘Codes of Corporate Conduct and the Labour Law Regulatory 
State in Developing Countries’, in John J. Kirton and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., Hard 
Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance 
(Aldershot, Ashgate 2004) p. 121; Zumbansen, loc. cit. n. 16. 
57  Roe, loc. cit. n. 4; Mark J. Roe, ‘German Co-Determination and German Securities 
Markets’, in Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch and Stefan Prigge, 
eds., Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1998) p. 361; Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate 
Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003). 
58  See references supra n. 21. 
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openly explored its possible demise.59 These developments strongly suggest that 
even in Germany, one of the heartlands of Michel Albert’s Rhenish capitalism,60 
there is a shift towards a more shareholder-driven corporate governance regime.61 
However, what the bird’s eye view of the observer fails to capture is the alto-
gether ambivalent process – both politically and institutionally – that characterises 
German company law reform. Here, the point is that the legal reform agenda is 
driven by an intricate and, for German traditions, seemingly unprecedented 
combination of official and unofficial law-making.62 The currently pursued 
reform agenda is the result of federal law-making and the work of an expert 
commission that was initiated by the government in 2000.63 That commission 
resulted in the issuance of detailed marching orders, recommendations and 
demands for the legislator as to how to adapt the German company law system to 
the ‘needs of global financial markets’.64 On the other hand, the commission also 
suggested the creation of a follow-on commission to draft a code of best practices, 
the so-called German Corporate Governance Code.65 An early discussion regard-
ing the Code’s legal nature quietly subsided.66 A comprehensive law reform in 
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59  See Strüve, loc. cit. n. 29, at p. 5. 
60  Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre Capitalisme (Paris, Editions du Seuil 1991). 
61  See Cioffi (2006), loc. cit. n. 47. 
62  See the increasing number of scholarly assessments of this process: Peter Hommelhoff 
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(Cologne, Schmidt 2001) p. 693; Stefan Berg and Mathias Stöcker, ‘Anwendungs- und 
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(2002) p. 1569; Marcus Lutter, ‘Die Kontrolle der gesellschaftsrechtlichen Organe: Corporate 
Governance – ein internationales Thema’, 24 Jura (2002) p. 83; Christoph H. Seibt, ‘Deutscher 
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Aktiengesellschaft (2002) p. 249; Gregor Bachmann, ‘Der “Deutsche Corporate Governance 
Kodex”: Rechtswirkungen und Haftungsrisiken’, Wertpapiermitteilungen (2002) p. 2137; 
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64  Theodor Baums, ed., Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance. 
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für Wirtschaftsrecht (2004) p. 1933; Henrik-Michael Ringleb, Thomas Kremer, Marcus Lutter 
and Axel von Werder, Kommentar zum Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex (Kodex-
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corporate law, which was initiated by the Social Democratic government at the 
time, seems to turn the dearly held cliché of Germany’s stakeholder capitalism 
company law regime on its head. The first and the second commissions, in 
preparing the legislative design and the collection of best practice guidelines, 
ingeniously managed to adopt allegedly universal models and terms through 
which they prepared the field for the major overhaul. But while everybody 
expected that this would mean the abolition of co-determination, change occurred 
in much more subtle, but clearly no less dramatic ways. The government did not 
openly attack co-determination, while the semi-political, quasi-public expert body 
– the commission – silently and effectively worked towards its deconstruction. 
Certainly, the recommendations pertaining to the isolation of the inter-shareholder 
dialogue from that of the stakeholders (the employees and union representatives)67 
must be seen within the context of the post-Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art 
fallout within the European company law scene.68 That scene, as regards the 
disembedded operationability of the incorporation theory for European companies 
seeing a dramatic increase in the mobility increase of companies, is still in search 
of the best legislative fix.69 
This change in the German approach, which has led to a larger role for unoffi-
cial, indirect forms of law-making,70 has important lessons to offer for our current 
and future appreciation of the European company law scene. It is here where we 
would still harbour hopes as to the preservation not only of difference with regard 
to the long-standing legal and socio-economic cultures in the Member States but 
also with regard to the preservation of an open eye for the forms in which law 
reform has been taking place in recent years across the globe. 
 
3.2 The ‘European company law scene’: overcoming diversity? 
 
The current European company law scene is characterised by an interesting 
tension between different trends and dynamics. When European scholars assessed 
the prospects of company law in Europe a couple of decades ago, no one doubted 
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Kommentar), 2nd edn. (Munich, Beck 2005) pp. 27-30: arguing that both the Baums Commis-
sion and the legislator intended the core of the Code to consist of non-binding 
recommendations for which no statutory authorisation would be necessary. 
67  See section 3.6 of the German Corporate Governance Code, available at: <http://www. 
corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/E_CorGov_Endfassung_June_2006_highlighted.pdf>. 
68  Christian Kersting and Clemens Christian Schindler, ‘The ECJ’s Inspire Art Decision of 
30 September 2003 and Its Effects on Practice’, 4 German Law Journal (2003) p. 1277. 
69  Dammann, loc. cit. n. 29. 
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its centrality in the making of a more integrated market, both economically and 
politically.71 A few decades down the road, the picture looks much different. 
What began with high hopes for harmonised and unified corporate law rules 
among the EC Member States eventually resulted in a series of increasingly long 
and exhausting law-making initiatives, the success of which in many cases 
depended on or was prevented by national resistance politics. While the European 
legislator made considerably little progress in the area of company law,72 this was 
not the case for capital markets law, where various regulations came out of 
Brussels. With regard to the diversity of company laws in Europe, this was for a 
long time and, indeed, until very recently seen as a particular feature and charac-
teristic aspect of the European company law scene. While it made consensus 
finding difficult in areas where change was recognised as being desirable, these 
obstacles made everyone sensitive to the existing variations in corporate law 
regimes and culture. The latter was always taken with a grain of salt among 
Europeans: while it reflected on the diversity within Europe, it was also seen as a 
problem with regard to corporate mobility in Europe and the attractiveness of 
European firms for international investors. 
This diversity has recently come to be seen in a different light. Reform at-
tempts in recent years have regularly included eloquent references – and 
reverences – to the existing diversity. At the same time, a number of develop-
ments suggest that the time for diversity might have come. For one, the 
Commission has taken several steps toward reinvigorating law reform in this area. 
These have grown out of the lengthy adoption process for two recent company 
law directives, one concerning corporate takeovers and the other one to the 
creation of a European Company Statute.73 Both were examples of drawn-out, 
tiresome and complex negotiation struggles, one of which occupied lawmakers 
for some thirty years, while the other one occupied almost half of that. In gearing 
up for a safe adoption of the Takeover Directive, the Commission initiated an 
expert committee process out of which grew, in quick succession, two of the first 
comprehensive reports on the law relating to takeovers and the state of European 
company law in general.74 These reports did not remain alone for long. At both 
the European and the Member State level, we are seeing a plethora of committee 
—————————————————— 
71  Clive Schmitthoff, ‘The Future of the European Company Law Scene’, in Clive Schmitt-
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73  Teichmann, loc. cit. n. 53, available at: <http://www.germanlawjournal.com>. 
74  The so-called ‘Winter Reports I and II’, named after their chairman, Dutch law professor 
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reports, expert findings, recommendations and self-regulatory codes. For the 
Commission, this has lead to a certain differentiation of its law-making agenda 
and methodology. Realising the political obstacles that stand in the way of 
harmonisation in specific core areas (e.g., board composition), the turn to soft 
law, benchmarking and self-regulation promises a viable alternative. 
However, there is another development that has a great impact on the shaping 
of the European company law scene. The already mentioned case law of the ECJ 
has dramatically altered the framework within which European managers are 
thinking about where to incorporate. The Court’s rejection of national govern-
ments’ attempts at preventing foreign European companies form forming 
subsidiaries in another European state has also put Member State lawmakers 
under increased pressure to revisit their existing company law regimes. Hence, 
following the case law in Centros (1999), Überseering (2002) and Inspire Art 
(2003), national governments throughout Europe have begun to make far-
reaching changes to their applicable company law rules to render their legal 
frameworks attractive under incorporation considerations.75 
It is against this two-fold background that we have to assess the current Euro-
pean company law scene. The debate concerning the degree to which the ECJ’s 
case law might have initiated a US-style process of regulatory competition is still 
ongoing.76 At the same time, the shape and structure of company law in Europe 
seems to be driven to a large extent by the already mentioned myriad forms of 
soft law and indirect regulation that have come to the fore in recent years.77 
Suffice it to point to the multi-level nature of these processes at the EU and the 
domestic Member State level to show how this levelled structure is eventually 
much more complicated, due to the fact that the relevant norms grow out of 
reports, codes and other forms of soft law. This makes a straightforward assess-
ment of the changes in the law dependent on the changes on the ground. In other 
words, without a better view of how codes are implemented, how firms are 
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actually responding to various suggestions of indirect and voluntary regulation, 
there can hardly be a satisfying evaluation of the changing company law scene.78 
What really matters in this respect, however, is that without a proper assessment 
of the changes ‘on the ground’ we will fail to appreciate how these many soft and 
indirect forms of norm-making, and the many ways in which companies have 
been marketing their commitment to specific corporate governance or corporate 
social responsibility standards, are reflective of an important shift in law-making. 
While the noted cases of national resistance to company law harmonisation 
put the political nature of corporate law in the spotlight, this space is rather dimly 
lit when it comes to soft law and self-regulation. Ironically, these norms are 
regularly not presented as law at all, because they do not have their origin in the 
state nor are they equipped with the traditional enforcement instruments that we 
know from state-made laws. Given their apparent distance from the state – and 
their proximity to the market – soft laws are understood as private norms without 
any real footing in the political sphere of the state’s law-making arena.79 It is this 
removal of indirect corporate law regulation from the political sphere that 
provokes the question whose interests are really served in the long run in this 
scenario. Given that a certain lobbying group succeeds in dominating the market 
for ideas with a certain concept for a while, what happens if the market begins to 
shift? Not only does the formerly successful concept allegedly lose the support of 
other market actors, but dependent personnel, employees, creditors and others 
involved with the firm might also suffer from a change in corporate organisation. 
We might just think this a natural effect of market actors’ self-regulation and 
accept them as collateral. We might also, however, stop to think whether self-
regulation can adequately capture and channel all of the involved stakeholders’ 
concerns in the different features of the firm’s organisation and governance. In 
other words, where we pursue corporate law reform and realise the need to 
overcome political deadlock that arises from path dependent, deeply embedded, 
politically, legally and culturally backed regulatory regimes, we would be well 
advised not to dismiss these features of embeddedness and the role of the law in 
this context. 
What should be seen as the most pressing of challenges in this regard is how 
to reconnect our ongoing assessment of the fast changing and continuously 
evolving modes of transnational governance, in the European Union.80 and 
generally,81 with a critical inquiry into national law-making trajectories and the 
—————————————————— 
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justifications offered in their support. One of the institutions engaged in a 
complex, interwoven process of negotiation facilitation and promotion of best 
practices is the European Corporate Governance Forum,82 established in pursu-
ance to a recommendation of the Winter II Group in their November 2002 report 
on European Company Law.83 The expert commission made it clear that such a 
structure, while facilitating a process and eventual results that would themselves 
be ‘voluntary and non-binding’, would be necessary in order to effectively work 
towards an improvement of corporate governance regimes.84 In fact, what we can 
observe to be arising from the European Corporate Governance Forum’s work in 
recent times is a far-reaching collection of policy recommendations and lawmak-
ing proposals that are portrayed as resulting from a quasi-natural process of 
almost technical content.85 ‘Good corporate governance’ has emerged as the 
regularly used formula to express the plethora of considerations that have 
informed the deliberations among the forum’s members. In the light of the 
alluded-to contestations of a convergence of corporate governance regimes and 
the ongoing explorations into the different elements of corporate governance, we 
are asked to further assess the merits of regulatory competition.86 and the apparent 
triumph of a finance perspective on the corporation.87 To be sure, ‘good (corpo-
rate) governance’ results from an intricate and complex process of ongoing 
political contestation and organisational experimentation. The latter is driven by 
economic competition and stakeholder dynamics that have begun to surpass the 
post-war paradigm of ‘industrial pluralism’ to include today a much wider and 
more differentiated wealth of societal rationalities. The corporation of the twenty-
first century can only be inadequately captured through the polarity of share-
holder and stakeholder interests. Instead, as both constituencies are transforming, 
our description of the firm itself must change. Elements of change include the 
assumption by corporations of large-scale public functions with regard to old-age 
—————————————————— 
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pensions and public service delivery, the far-reaching alteration of corporate 
ownership structures and, finally, the degree to which firms become ever-more 
versatile and flexible organisations within a transnational knowledge economy. 
The concluding section will now explore these perspectives in more detail. 
 
 
4. THE LEARNING FIRM 
 
4.1 The transnational regulatory challenges of corporate governance 
reform 
 
This paper began by taking a perspective on the role of the employee in the firm. 
This focus has helped to illustrate the current regulatory framework for workers’ 
involvement in firm management. Moreover, a study of contemporary develop-
ments in corporate governance has revealed that a discussion of co-determination 
forms but a part of a much larger reflection process on corporate governance 
rules. While there has been a long-standing debate as to the substantive goals of 
corporate law regulation,88 this discussion has been rendered intricately more 
complex due in part to the fact that the perspectives on corporate law have been 
multiplied, enriched and widespread, making corporate law the ‘hottest game in 
town’.89 Another reason why corporate law is increasingly recognised as a very 
promising field in terms of research and reform potential.90 also has to do with the 
field’s fascinating and challenging regulatory dimensions. The proliferation of 
law-making arenas in the area of corporate law at the domestic, transnational and 
international level constitutes a prime challenge to traditional understandings of 
domestic bodies of corporate law with an occasional comparative glance to the 
right or the left of one’s borders. Instead, corporate law has advanced to being one 
of the most highly researched fields in terms of doctrinal, comparative, economic, 
organisational, historical and political approaches.91 Before long, the immense 
impact of these changes will be noticed and translated into core corporate law 
curricula as well. The changing forms of law-making and the ensuing multi-
jurisdictional competition between official and unofficial, soft and hard norms in 
corporate regulation constitute a formidably complex landscape, the exploration 
of which has only just begun. 
—————————————————— 
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The focus on management and employees, however, was taken to open the 
door to an analysis of the corporation that would not limit its inquiry to traditional 
elements of monitoring management, even if that included occasional assess-
ments, for example, of the German two-tier board and worker co-determination in 
supervisory boards.92 Instead, the moving of employees into the present corporate 
governance spotlight was aimed at eventually gaining a better picture of what 
constitutes ‘good’ corporate governance on the organisational level. It is this 
level, which is often neglected in corporate law scholarship, that remains for the 
most part within a rights paradigm of the corporation.93 While the combination of 
structural analysis of the assigned rights of those invested in the corporation with 
a particular view on the economic results of a particular regime has the advantage 
of illuminating the tensions among different economic interests within and around 
the corporation,94 it appears to fall short of capturing the processes and institu-
tional dimensions of the firm in operation.95 
 
4.2 Beyond the shareholder v. stakeholder divide: 
the Strine-Bainbridge debate of 2007 
 
Without a better understanding of the processes within the firm that result from an 
institutional interaction within and outside the firm’s boundaries, it is hard to 
imagine one would ever be in a position to make reasonable assessments about 
the connection between corporate governance and economic performance. The 
picture changes, however, if the concept of corporate governance is redefined by 
drawing on the wider institutional perspective alluded to before. Where varieties 
of capitalism scholars have importantly advanced our understanding of the market 
structures that are conducive to and interacting with particular governance 
strategies and structures, this perspective must be complemented in two ways. 
One is the integration of a regulatory theory approach to the understanding of 
corporate governance developments. Given the proliferation of norm producers, 
localities and spheres for corporate rule-making, any assessment of corporate 
governance developments must take this regulatory dimension into account. 
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The second complementing perspective is directed at the structures of the 
corporation itself. The two models that we have learned to identify as being 
situated at opposite ends of the spectrum are the nexus-of-contracts conception of 
the corporation,96 on the one hand, and the corporation as a social/political/ 
organic entity,97 on the other. A recent articulation of the corporation as a ‘social 
institution’ was provided by Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr., who argued that  
 
both management and labour are likely to view a public corporation as some-
thing more than a nexus of contracts, as more akin to a social institution that, 
albeit having the ultimate goal of producing profits for stockholders, also 
durably serves and exemplifies other societal values. In particular, both man-
agement and labor recoil at the notion that a corporation’s worth can be 
summed up entirely by the current price the equity markets place on its stock, 
much less that the immediate demands of the stock market should thwart the 
long-term pursuit of corporate growth.98  
 
An intimate expert of US corporate governance politics with an ear close to the 
ground, Strine aptly identifies the blind spots in the reigning and raging ‘corpo-
rate governance industry’ made up of ‘public pension fund administrators, proxy 
advisory and corporate governance ratings organisations, corporate law scholars, 
and business journalists’.99 Strine directs his critique at the heart of the dominant 
school of thought, which contends that the Berle and Means challenge of over-
coming the separation of ownership and control still stands. In contrast, Strine 
argues that given the high concentration of stocks in institutional investors, the 
Berle and Means equation has been reversed, now in favour of stockholders. But 
who are they? For one thing, the reality of stock market-based old-age pensions 
turns most employees into ‘forced’ capitalists, although they hardly ‘own’ 
anything directly. The owners are large institutional investors, intermediaries 
between employees and the firm.100 At the heart of Strine’s critique, then, is his 
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concern with an unceasing flow of literature demanding shareholder empower-
ment against management that stands in bizarre contrast to the disassociation of 
employees’ ownership from exercising long-term, pension-oriented rights vis-à-
vis ‘their’ corporation. He thus finds it particularly troubling that most of the 
current corporate responsibility and corporate governance efforts are made 
without the awareness that they eventually serve to empower not those with long-
term interests in the viability of the corporation but rather intermediaries with less 
clearly demarcated interests, which might frequently be directed towards high 
short-term returns than long-term sustained performance.  
Immediately contested,101 Strine’s suggestions focus on appropriate means of 
shareholder empowerment precisely with the goal of identifying the long-term 
orientations of a firm’s strategic outfit in order to disclose to stockholders in 
greater detail where a company stands and where its dominating investors intend 
to take it.102 Instead of ‘feeding the market beast’, as was the case before the 
market meltdown in Enron and Worldcom, efforts should be made to improve 
disclosure rules that would ‘enable managers to focus more on sustainable, long-
term corporate growth and less on the market’s short-term expectations.’103 
Interestingly enough, it is the critic of Strine’s common sense and shared interests 
approach who returns the analysis to an atomised interest pluralism model, which 
allows him to purportedly dismiss Strine’s contentions regarding such shared 
interests. Claiming that the degree of diversity among the different corporate 
stakeholders effectively defeats any contention of shared values between the 
firm’s constituencies, Bainbridge evades the central challenge that Strine formu-
lates, namely, to recognise that both management and employees share a basic 
interest in the sustained success of a business enterprise. Regrettably, for the time 
being, Bainbridge dismisses this claim, without pursuing further the idea what it 
would mean for our understanding of a firm’s constituencies and the firm itself if 
we adopted a more wholesome approach to the firm and its stakeholders. 
 
4.3 Corporate decision making in the knowledge society 
 
In the following, I want to suggest an alternative perspective on the corporation. 
For this purpose, I put forward the thesis that neither the contractual nor the 
interest pluralism paradigms of the corporation can fully illuminate the internal 
workings of the firm. In particular, neither approach can adequately identify or 
assess the processes by which knowledge is generated, disseminated and executed 
within the corporation or, in other words, which processes in fact precede and 
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inform any decision made by corporate management. While the contract model of 
the corporation remains confined to explaining corporate decision making with 
regard to agreements among the firm’s stakeholders, even in cases of so-called 
‘incomplete contracts’,104 the interest pluralism model of the corporation tends to 
one-sidedly focus on identifiable interests of specific stakeholders of the firm, 
such as employees, unions or creditors.105 This also appears to be true in the most 
recent Strine-Bainbridge dialogue. In contrast, a possibly more promising 
perspective on the firm’s institutional nature in making decisions possible could 
start with the premise that the elements shaping corporate decisions are never in a 
static, foreseeable or fully determinable state. Rather, corporate decision making 
by necessity involves a high-risk assessment of uncertain development trajecto-
ries, market strategies and product conceptualisations. The complexity of the field 
to be assessed by management must be reflected in the way in which we speak 
about the regulation of corporate activity. From this perspective, then, the firm 
itself moves into the centre of attention. In other words, corporate governance that 
claims to effectively address the core challenges of governing a corporation must 
take the particular features of a firm’s decision-making processes into considera-
tion. 
Accordingly, it is this second complementary perspective that will be unfolded 
in more detail in the remainder of this paper. The key to understanding the 
contemporary corporation in the political economy of the de-territorialised 
knowledge economy is to focus on its capacity to remain innovative.106 The firm’s 
capacity to engage in innovative production depends on its ability to constantly 
grow, adapt and learn. This it can do by letting go of traditional modes of 
command and control and instead embracing an ironic, detached, reflective and 
post-heroic attitude to corporate governance and management. The corporation 
becomes an ‘interpreting system that constantly observes its environment, its 
markets, competitors, customers and suppliers in search of gaps that it may fill 
itself. The corporation is under incessant pressure to develop and fill its own 
niche while everything else remains in constant change, including its niche.’107 
Our urgently sought definition of the corporation’s responsibilities, its public 
duties and obligations to society at large, especially in an era of scandalous 
corporate crime, depends entirely on our understanding of the firm itself. It is here 
that we recognise the relevance for our theme of the fierce battle between 
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shareholder value- oriented systems of corporate control and those that place a 
higher emphasis on workers’ voice, participation, industrial relations and a wider 
consideration of the firm’s stakeholders.108 Whether we emphasise the shareholder 
or the stakeholder dimension of the firm will have a significant impact on our 
assignment of duties and obligations to the firm.109 This is particularly relevant 
with regard to disclosure.110 In cases where corporate governance reform is 
predominantly concerned with shareholders, the emphasis is likely to remain 
placed – at least for the time being – on improvements in financial auditing 
schemes. In contrast, if we were to focus on an improved environmental account-
ability of the firm, we would indeed direct our initiatives at other areas of 
corporate organisation. In fact, environmental internal auditing constitutes a 
prime example of the latter developments in environmental corporate self-
regulation.111 In other words, the question of the firm’s responsibilities cannot be 
separated from a more refined understanding of the firm in its various, highly 
differentiated and specialised contexts. 
From the perspective of the firm within a functionally differentiated knowl-
edge society, even the connection made between the political economy of the firm 
and the firm’s environmental (or wider social) responsibilities would still provide 
only an insufficient account of the corporation itself. Today’s large, publicly held 
and globally operating firms escape clear definitions, both with regard to their 
core activities or ‘competences’112 and their organisational structure. Increasingly, 
firms have become unbounded, borderless and virtual, with activities that span 
multiple areas of industry, manufacture, products or services. Echoing many of 
the challenges that the state faces today in a complex society, the firm constitutes 
a highly complex organisation that operates in a volatile regulatory and competi-
tive environment, which is at its heart characterised by a fast evolving body of 
specialised knowledge. We should thus reject both overly simplistic categorisa-
tions of the firm as either shareholder- or stakeholder-oriented, as the firm of the 
twenty-first century challenges our learned ways of organising social behaviour. 
Shifting both the corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the corporate govern-
ance debate away from the control-oriented images of the corporation, with its 
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focus on the struggle between shareholders and stakeholders, is an essential first 
step in beginning to rephrase the question of the firm’s societal functions. 
Questioning the definitional clarity of the term ‘social’ in CSR, the firm must be 
viewed within a complex web made up of socio-economic, political and cultural 
factors, in which the corporation is embedded. The various functions that a 
corporation is assuming have repercussions on the evolution of corporate govern-
ance well beyond an oppositional model of shareholder v. stakeholder interests.  
From the perspective of society as an ongoing communication process of dif-
ferent rationalities, corporate governance can adequately be understood as an 
ongoing process of organisational experiments.113 within a constantly evolving 
business enterprise, operating in a polycontextual environment. It is in this light 
that the ongoing discussion over the convergence or divergence of corporate 
governance regimes must take into account the particular embeddedness of the 
firm within historically grown, and functionally evolving socio-economic and 
political contexts. Today’s corporations are placed within a constantly changing 
environment that is determined functionally rather than territorially or politically. 
While specific local regulatory influences on the operation of the firm are of 
importance, the firm’s corporate governance regime is shaped by the functional 
elements of the firm’s operation. For example, with corporations’ increasingly 
important assumptions of formerly public functions such as welfare, pensions or 
medical care, it has since long become questionable whether a corporation can be 
adequately described as either private or public in nature. While such contesta-
tions of the nature of the business enterprise already have a considerable legacy,114 
the functionalist critique of both the shareholder v. stakeholder paradigm of 
corporate governance and the public-private divide in determining the nature of 
the firm goes much further still. From the perspective of societal functional 
differentiation, it is a mere historical contingency that the discussion of corporate 
governance would be dominated – for some time – by such connotations as 
‘shareholders’ and ‘stakeholders’, on the one hand, and the public v. private 
nature of the corporation, on the other. While varieties of capitalism scholarship 
succeeds in reiterating the contextuality of corporate governance development, it 
still has to be developed further to move away from contentions of path depend-
ency, and thus upheld claims of persisting divergence, in order to recognise the 
complexity in which the business corporation is the collision site of different 
societal rationalities. 
—————————————————— 
113  Amin and Cohendet, op. cit. n. 32, at p. 117: ‘The key management challenge, thus, is 
to strike a delicate balance between existing routines and the exploration of novelty.’ 
114  See only John Dewey, ‘The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality’, 35 
Yale L. J. (1926) p. 655. 
